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This article discusses the relationship between costs and burden of 
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America ('US ') and Germany through significant case law and 
deliberation. 
l INTRODUCTION (STEFAN KROLL) 
At first sight, it appears strange to combine the topics of burden of 
proof and costs under the CISG in one discussion. A closer look 
reveals however, that there are more similarities between them than 
merely having been a part of the problem for the 23 rd Willem C Vis 
Arbitration Moot (' Vis problem ' ). First, both topics are of 
considerable practical importance in international dispute resolution, 
in particular, arbitration. Second, both topics concern the 
intersection of substantive and procedural law. Third, there still 
seems to be a common law/civil law divide, or to be more precise a 
US/Germany divide, in the treatment of these problems. 
A The Practical Relevance of the Topics 
The practical importance of both topics is often underestimated, not 
only by students, but also by parties. 1 In law school, the discussion 
nonnally concerns which legal principles apply to a particular case. 
In practice however, the cases frequently tum more on the facts than 
on the law. The applicable legal principles are clear; the primary 
issue is how to prove the facts are necessary for their application. 
Documents, and in particular required signed versions of them, may 
have been lost, witnesses may no longer be available, or the parties 
See, for the lack of substantive pleadings of the parties on the 
question of costs, John Y Gotanda, ' Bringing Effi ciency to the 
Awarding of Fees and Costs in International Arbitration ' in Stefan 
Michael Kr1ill et al (eds), International Arbitration and International 
Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution (Kluwer Law 
lnternational, 2011) 141- 2. 
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may, for other reasons, have no access to the evidence needed. If the 
remaining evidence is not sufficient for the tribunal or the court to 
form a view on what has happened with the required certainty, the 
question inevitably arises: which party bears the burden of proof for 
a particular fact? 
The practical relevance of the cost question results from the fact that 
arbitration is by no means cheap, despite the cost advantages which 
might exist in comparison to court proceedings, at least if they 
involve several proceedings. An extreme example for this is 
Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corporation v Shanghai Zhonglu 
Industrial Co Ltd. 2 According to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, 
which rejected the request to set aside the award, both parties spent 
more than US$ I 0 million for an arbitration which resulted in an 
award ordering the respondent to pay US$89 106. l 0 with interest 
and to return 2000 bowling balls.
3 An issue generally found in 
arbitration is that costs escalate even beyond such extreme cases as 
this one, which is well evidenced by criticism raised by users4 and 
the various initiatives taken by institutions to curb costs. The 
lntemational Chamber of Commerce ('ICC') for example has issued 
a number of guidelines in its brochure on how to avoid costs and 
delay in arbitration. 5 
[2009] HKCFI 94; [201 I] HKLRD 707. 
Ibid. 
See Paul Hobeck, Volker Mahnken and Max Koebke, 'Time for 
Woolf Reforms in International Construction Arbitration ' [2008] 
11 (2) International Arbitration law Review 84. 
Lnternational Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Commission, 
' Report on Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration ' 
(Report 861-1 , International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
Commission, 2012). 
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B Intersection Between Procedural law and Substantive Law 
The second common feature is that they are located at the borderline 
of procedural law and substantive law. In the majority of cases, 
costs are determined by arbitral tribunals on the basis of guidelines 
contained in procedural rules. These are often the applicable 
arbitration rules or - primarily in ad hoe arbitration - the 
applicable national arbitration law.6 Typical for the content of such 
rules is art 37 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. It provides under the 
heading 'Decisions as to the Cost of the Arbitration' in the relevant 
paras 3-5 that: 
3. At any time during the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal 
may make decisions on costs, other than those to be fixed by the 
Court, and order payment. 
4. The final award shall fix the costs of the arbitration and decide 
which of the parties shall bear them or in what proportion they 
shall be borne by the parties. 
5. In making decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take 
into account such circumstances as it considers relevant, 
including the extent to which each party has conducted the 
arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.7 
In particular, where the guiding principle of cost allocation is a 
'costs-follow-the-event' approach, the tlipside of these rules and 
laws granting procedural powers to the tribunal, is a claim by the 
winning party - based on procedural law - to be reimbursed for 
costs incurred. In the end, it is for each tribunal to allocate the costs 
incurred during the arbitration or in connection with the underlying 
dispute. The rules applicable in arbitral proceedings regulate not 
only the allocation of the costs but also which costs are required to 
See for example, German Code of Civil Procedure§ 1057. 
International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of 
Arbitration Arbitration Rules Mediation Rules (2013) [3]- [5]. 
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be reimbursed. At the same time, they normally provide much more 
flexibility to the tribunal than a court has in litigation, where the 
rules are often drafted with purely domestic cases in mind. In light 
of that, and the greater complexity of the disputes resulting later in 
international arbitral proceedings, the parties often ask for the 
reimbursement of costs which go beyond those legal fees incurred 
directly from the arbitral proceedings. 
That may involve not only costs incurred before the arbitral 
proceedings were initiated when the parties tried to settle their case 
amicably, but also costs incurred in actions before the State courts 
either for interim relief or to make arbitration proceedings possible 
at all. In particular, in the latter cases, the question arises whether 
such costs can be reimbursed in the arbitral proceedings in so far as 
they have not been reimbursed in the court proceedings. These costs 
may be either closely connected to proceedings or, having been 
spent in actions without which the proceedings may not have been 
possible, necessary or reasonable for the proper pursuit of a case. 
At the same time, the cost incurred for the proceedings are also a 
direct consequence of the other party' s breach of contract. 8 The 
question which arises is how these two different claims are 
connected with each other; in particular, whether the substantive 
claim is pre-empted by the procedural rules or vice versa. Equally, 
the question of burden of proof may involve both substantive and 
procedural elements. That is well evidenced by the Italian decision 
Jose Rosell, ' Arbitration Costs as Relief and/or Damage' (2011) 28 
Journal of International Arbitration 115, 116. 
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of the Tribunale di Vigevano [District Court Vigevano] in 
Rhein/and Versicherungen v Atlarex. 9 
There, the Court came to the conclusion that the question of burden 
of proof for the non-conformity of the goods was a question of 
substantive law, as it was so closely related to the substantive claim. 
Consequently, the question to be considered was governed by the 
CISG. At the same time, the Court submitted the question: by which 
evidentiary means could the buyer discharge its burden pursuant to 
Italian law? This issue was considered to be procedural and 
therefore governed by the /ex fori. The question as to which law 
governs the standard of proof was not addressed explicitly, despite 
its relevance and connection with the question of which party bears 
the burden of proof. 
At the same time, the need for sophisticated rules on the burden of 
proof depends to a certain extent on what access parties have to 
evidence. Where a party can obtain all the evidence it needs, on the 
basis of procedural rules allowing for discovery, there is less need to 
think about whether it is appropriate to impose the burden of proof 
upon it. 10 
10 
Rhein/and Versicherungen v Atlarex, Tribunale di Vigevano (District 
Court Vigevano ), No 405, 12 July 2000 reported in (200 I) 20 Journal 
of Law and Commerce 209, 218-21. 
For the interaction between the rules on taking evidence in procedural 
law and the question of burden of proof, which in the majority of 
jurisdictions is considered to be a rule of substantive law, see Rolf 
Trittmann, 'The Interplay Between Procedural and Substantive Law 
in International Arbitration' (20 I 6) Schieds VZ German Arbitration 
Journal 7. 
--
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C Common Law - Civil Law Divide 
The third common feature, closely related to the second, is that there 
still seems to be a divide between common law and civil law. That is 
well reflected by the following discussion and the case law 
presented therein. There may be several different reasons for that, 
starting from the thinking in remedies or claims over different 
approaches to statutory interpretation, to a generally different 
attitude to an extensive interpretation of the CISG. Last but not 
least, differences in procedural law may contribute to the different 
approaches. 
JI BURDEN OF PROOF: GOVERNED BY THE CISG 
(ULRICH SCHROETER) 
Although I personally hold a more sceptical view about this issue, 11 
I will (in the following) try to describe what has often been referred 
to as the 'majority view' 12 under the CISG, namely that the 
Convention governs the allocation of the burden of proof, 13 and 
II 
12 
13 
See Peter Schlechtriem and Ulrich G Schroeter, lnternationales UN-
Kaufrecht, (Mohr Siebeck, 5th ed, 2013) 100. 
Milena Djordjevic, 'Article 4' in Stefan Kroll, Loukas Mistelis and 
Pilar Perales Viscasillas (eds), UN-Convention on Contracts for the 
international Sales of Goods (C!SG) (Verlag CH Beck oHG and Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 62 (34] ; Franco Ferrari, 'Burden of Proo funder the 
CJSG', (2000-01) Review of the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) I. 
Oberster Gerichtshof [Austrian Supreme Court], CISG-online o 
1364, 12 September 2006; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal 
Supreme Court], CISG-online No 651 , 9 January 2002 reported in 
(2002) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1651 ; Bundesgerichtshof 
[German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online No 847, 30 June 
2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3181 ; 
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exhaustively at that. 14 Whether the same applies to the standard of 
proof is yet another matter that will not be covered here. 15 
14 
15 
Rhein/and Versicherungen v Atlarex, Tribunale di Vigevano (District 
Court Vigevano), o 405 12 July 2000 reported in (2001) 20 Journal 
of law and Commerce 209, 218-21; Djordjevic, above n 12, 62; 
Franco Ferrari, 'Article 4' in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg 
Schwenzer (eds), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht -
CISG - (CH Beck, 6th ed, 2013) 127; Franco Ferrari, 'Burden of 
Proof under the CISG' (2000-01) Review of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods {CISG) I; Stefan Kroll, 
'The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods under Art 35 
CISG' (2011) LIX Belgrade Law Review 162, 168; Ulrich Magnus, 
'Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG)' in J von Staudinger (ed), Kommentar 
zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfiihrungsgesetz und 
Nebengesetzen (2013), Art 4 [69]; Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal 
Hachem, 'Article 4' in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed), Schlehtriem & 
Schwenzer: Commentary on the Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG), (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2016) 68. 
See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-
online No 651, 9 January 2002, reported in (2002) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1651: ' ... the CISG regulates the burden of proof[ ... ], 
so that consequently, recourse to the national law is pre-empted to 
that extent'. 
See Kantonsgericht Nidwalden [District Court Nidwalden], CISG-
online No 1086, 23 May 2005, reported in (2005) lnternationales 
Handelsrecht 253, 254; Peter Schlechtriem and Ulrich G Schroeter, 
lnternationales UN-Kaufrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 5th ed, 2013) 10 I: 
standard of proof is not governed by the CISG; contra Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, 'Article 74' in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed), Schlechtriem 
and Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CJSG), (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 
2016) 1085: standard of proof is governed by the CISG. 
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A CJSG Provisions Explicitly Addressing the Burden of Proof 
The CISG contains a number of provisions that explicitly address 
the allocation of the burden of proof. Among them, the clearest one 
is art 79(1) of the CISG, which provides that '[a] party is not liable 
for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the 
failure was due to an impediment beyond his control'. 16 In addition, 
a number of other CISG provisions address the burden of proof for 
certain of the prerequisites contained therein through the term 
'unless ... '. An example is art 2(a), which provides that the CISG 
does not apply to sales of goods bought for personal, family or 
household use, 'unless the seller, at any time before or at the 
conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known 
that the goods were bought for any such use'. 17 
It is commonly said that the wording of art 2(a) indicates that the 
party alleging that the seller neither knew nor ought to have known 
that the goods were bought for personal, family or household use 
bears the burden of proving this fact. 18 This understanding of the use 
of the term 'unless', which in the case of art 2(a) is supported by the 
16 
17 
18 
Emphasis added. 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods ('CISG '), opened for signature 11 April 1980, I 9 ILM 668, 
(entered into force I January 1988) art 2(a). 
John O Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 
United Nations Convention, (Kluwer Law International, 3rd ed, 1999) 
48; Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, 'Article 2' in Ingeborg 
Schwenzer ( ed), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (C/SG), (Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed, 2016) 36; Frank Spohnheimer, 'Article 2' in 
Stefan Kroll, Loukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas (eds), UN-
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods 
(CISG), (Hart Publishing, 2011) 45. 
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provisions ' drafting history, 19 mirrors a classical civil law-style 
regulation of the burden of proof. It has therefore - maybe not 
surprisingly - found a particularly strong support among CISG 
commentators with a civil law background. Apart from art 2(a), 
other CISG provisions containing an ' unless' clause are arts 3(1), 
9(2), 14(2), 18(2), 19(2), 21 (2), 25(2), 27, 28, 3 3(b), 35(2), 39(2), 
41 , 46(1), 46(3), 47(2), 48(4), 49(2), 58(3), 62, 63(2), 64(2), 66 and 
93(3), although its use certainly does not in each case signify an 
allocation of the burden of proof. 
Finally, art 35(2)(b) employs a similar expression: 
19 
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do 
not conform with the contract unless they [ ... ) are fit for any 
particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
See the discussion of art 2(a) CISG within the 'UNCITRAL Working 
Group' in (1975), VI UNCITRAL Yearbook 49, 51 Nos 25, 26: 'It was 
also observed that in some legal systems the use of the word "if' as 
used in the text proposed by Working Party II would require the party 
relying on the "if' clause to prove that which was in the clause. In 
contrast, the use of the word "unless", as in the text presented by the 
observer, would put the burden on the seller to prove his knowledge 
or lack of knowledge of the intended use of the goods. [ ... ] The 
Working Group adopted the text proposed by the observer; see also 
the comments by delegate Ludvik Kopac, during the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, United Nations Conference on Contracts for 
the International Sale o/Goods, UN GAOR, 39th Comm, 1st sess, UN 
Doc NCONF.97/ 19 (10 March- 11 April 1980) 238: 'He had no 
objection to the principle behind the paragraph but felt the wording 
could be improved. The crucial part of the provision was the clause 
beginning "unless the seller"... and in the form in which it was 
currently worded it implied that there was an obligation to prove an 
absence of knowledge that the goods were bought for personal, 
family or household use . .. '. 
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seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except 
where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or 
that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and 
judgement. 20 
It is widely accepted that the phrase 'except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely [ ... ] on the seller's 
skill and judgement' imposes a burden of proof on the person 
arguing that fact. 21 Interestingly, this use of the term 'except where' 
appears only in art 35(2)(b) and nowhere else within the 
Convention. 
B General Principle on the Burden of Proof Allocation 
Underlying the CISG 
Against the background of the provisions just described, the current 
majority opinion under the CISG goes a step further by suggesting 
that the Convention is based on a general principle of the burden of 
proof allocation in the sense of art 7(2) of the CISG.22 Accordingly, 
all questions arising with respect to the burden of proof under CISG 
20 
21 
22 
CISG, above n 17, art35(2)(b). 
Harry M Flechtner, 'Moving Through Tradition Towards 
Universalism under the UN Sales Convention (CISG): Notice of Lack 
of Conformity (Article 39) and Burden of Proof in the 
Bundesgerichtshof Opinion of 30 June 2004 ' in Johan Erauw et al 
(eds), Liber Memoralis Professor Petar Sarcevic (Sellier European 
Law Publishers, 2006) 457, 467; Stefan Kroll, 'The Burden of Proof 
for the Non-Conformity of Goods under Art 35 CISG', (2011) LIX 
Belgrade Law Review I 62, 176; Ingeborg Schwenzer, 'Article 35 ' in 
Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary 
on the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
(Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2016) 621. 
See the extensive references in Djordjevic, above n 12, [36] ; Kroll 
above n I, 168; Schwenzer and Hachem, above n 13, 68. 
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contracts supposedly have to be answered in accordance with this 
general principle as well as in those cases where no explicit 
provisions listed above applies. Consequently, any recourse to 
domestic law relating to the burden of proof is forbidden. 
According to the majority view, the CISG's underlying general 
principle on the burden of proof essentially has three prongs. First, 
that every party has to prove the facts on which its claim, right, or 
defence is based.23 Second, that the party relying on an exception 
must prove this exception.24 Third, in exceptional circumstances, 
considerations of equity - for example the notion of proximity of 
proof or unacceptable difficulties for one party to furnish evidence 
- can lead to a shifting of the burden of proof. 25 In other words, 
23 
24 
25 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 651, 9 January 2002 reported in (2002) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1651; Oberster Gerichtshof [Austrian Supreme Court], 
CISG-online No 1364, 12 September 2006; Schwenzer and Hachem, 
above n 13, 68. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
W ochenschri ft 31 81. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 3181 ; Oberster Gerichtshof [Austrian Supreme Court], 
CISG-online No. 1364, 12 September 2006; Franco Ferrari, 'Artikel 
4' in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed), Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Kommentar 
zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht- C!SG-(CH Beck, 6th ed, 2013) 
127; Franco Ferrari, 'Burden of Proof under the CISG', Review of the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
[2000-0 I] 1; Ulrich Magnus, ' Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG)' in 
J von Staudinger (ed), Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einfohrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen (Sellier/De Gruyter, 2013) 
art 4, 69. 
--
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where facts are so closely connected to the sphere of one party that 
it is impossible for the counter-party to prove these facts, the burden 
of proof must be allocated or shifted to the first party.26 
For such an overwhelming majority view, it is interesting that the 
reasons supporting this three-prong general principle seem 
surprisingly thin. As far as the wording of the CISG is concerned, 
art 79(1) CISG could be read as confirming the first prong, whereas 
art 2(a) CISG (and similar 'unless ... ' provisions) could confirm the 
second prong. However, in spite of these factors, it could as 
convincingly be argued that arts 79(1) and 2(a) CISG as well as 
similar provisions are superfluous if a general principle of the type 
described above is really underlying the CISG. This would leave the 
argument that the drafters of the CISG wanted to make sure that the 
burden of proof allocation could be easily discerned in instances in 
which this seemed particularly important to the drafters - however, 
there is only limited support in the travaux preparatoires for this 
• 27 assumption. 
Further, difficulties are highlighted by case law decided under the 
CISG, according to which the CISG's burden of proof rules do not 
reach further than the Convention's substantive scope as defined in 
art 4.28 Accordingly, the question of whether, and possibly which, 
evidentiary consequences an actual admission of liability by one 
26 
27 
28 
Schwenzer and Hachem, above n 13, 68. 
For references to the travaux preparatoires that indicate the contrary 
- namely that the drafters did not want to regulate the burden of 
proof through specific terms in CISG provisions - see Harry M 
Flechtner, 'Selected Issues Relation to the CISG ' s Sphere of 
Application' (2009) 13 Vindobona Journal of international 
Commercial law and Arbitration 91 , 102-5. 
CISG, above n 17, art 4. 
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party has, is supposedly not governed by the CISG but by domestic 
law. 29 The limited scope of the CISG thereby opens a backdoor to a 
non-uniform treatment of matters that are arguably as closely related 
to the burden of proof and its discharge as the rules of substantive 
law.30 An argument made by supporters of the prevailing view -
namely, that the burden of proof is so closely connected with the 
application of the substantive provisions that it would be 
impracticable to separate the two - therefore sounds somewhat 
hollow.31 
C Shifting the Burden of Proof A Decisive Test Case 
It is, however, the third prong that appears to be the most 
troublesome. It was used by the German Federal Supreme Court 
when applying art 40 of the CISG to a case in which the buyer 
argued that the seller was not entitled to rely on the lack of a notice 
of non-conformity by the buyer under art 39. This was because the 
lack of conformity of the goods (paprica powder) allegedly related 
to facts of which the seller knew or could not have been unaware of 
and which he did not disclose to the buyer. 32 
The burden of proof for the existence of such facts known to the 
seller would normally have been borne by the buyer however, under 
the general principle's second prong, the buyer relied on the 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 651, 9 January 2002 reported in (2002) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1651. 
Flechtner, above n 21 , 104-5. 
Djordjevic, above n 12, 36; Kroll , above n 13, 169. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 3 181. 
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exception of art 40. The Federal Supreme Court held that an 
exception to this rule may be necessary in individual cases under the 
notion of ' proof-proximity' (Beweisnahe) or if an evidentiary 
showing results in unreasonable difficulties of proof for the buyer.33 
In support of the principle' s third prong thus created, the Court 
argued that it is recognised within the scope of the CISG 'that a 
strict application of the "exception-to-the-rule" principle can lead to 
inequities'. 34 Therefore, a correction is 'necessary according to the 
principles set forth herein' ,35 but it remains that 'prudence is 
appropriate '. 36 
The Court further elaborated as follows: 
33 
34 
35 
36 
The law allows for this aspect within the framework of Article 
40 CISG in that it does not always demand proof of the seller's 
knowledge of the facts on which the contractual breach is 
based, but rather deems it sufficient that the seller 'could not 
have been unaware of those facts; thus, Article 40 CISG also 
Ibid. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court] , CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 3 181. 
The Federal Supreme Court refers to Gerhard Hepting, 'Vor Art I 
WKR' in Gottfried Baumg!l.rtel and Hans-Willi Laumen (eds), 
Handbuch der Beweislast im Privatrecht (Handbook on the Burden of 
Proof in Private Law) (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2nd ed, 1999) vol 2, 
28- 30; Magnus, above n 13, art 4 [69] ; Ferrari, in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN -
Kaufrecht - CISG - (CH Beck, 6th ed, 2013) 127. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
W ochenschrift 3 181. 
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covers cases of negligent ignorance.37 Under certain 
circumstances, the required proof can already be deduced from 
the type of defect itself so that, in the case of extreme 
deviations from the contractually agreed upon condition, gross 
negligence is assumed if the breach of contract occurred in the 
seller's domain.38 According to the principles mentioned 
above, it may be necessary to limit the buyer's burden of proof 
in the case of a gross breach of contract and in view of the 
aspect of 'proof-proximity' (Beweisntihe) in order to avoid 
unreasonable difficulties in providing proof.39 
It is striking that the Federal Supreme Court, in resorting to the so-
called Beweisniihe, used a legal concept developed under German 
civil law and applied it to the CISG40 - an approach that is difficult 
to reconcile with both the regard to the CISG's international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application, as 
called for in art 7(1 ). Assuming that the allocation of the burden of 
proof is a matter governed by the CISG (as the prevailing view 
37 
38 
39 
40 
The Federal Supreme Court refers to Wilhelm-Albrecht Achilles, 
Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrechtsubereinkommen (2000), art 40 [I) ; 
Alexander Lilderitz, 'Artikel 40 EKG' in Hans Theodor Soergel (ed), 
Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Kohlhammer, 12th ed, 
1991 ), I; Alexander LUderitz and Dirk SchilBler-Langeheine, 'Artikel 
40 CISG' (Article 40 CISG) in Hans Theodor Soergel (ed), 
Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Kohlhammer, 13th ed, 
2000) 1-2. 
The Federal Supreme Court refers to Wilhelm-Albrecht Achilles, 
Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrechtsubereinkommen (2000) art 40 [4l 
Li.ideritz, above n 37, I ; see also LUderitz and SchilBler-Langeheine, 
above n 37, 3; Magnus, above n 13, 13. 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], CISG-online 
No 847, 30 June 2004 reported in (2004) Neue Juristische 
W ochenschrift 3181 . 
See, eg, Flechtner, above n 21, 104-5; Kroll, above n 13, 168. 
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believes), any shifting of this burden to the other party would have 
to be based on arguments drawn from the CISG itself. In this 
respect, one could think of an interpretation of the CISG's burden of 
proof rules in accordance with good faith in international trade41 in 
cases in which a party is faced with unreasonable difficulties in 
providing the required evidence. 
D Arbitration Agreements as a Potential Derogation from the 
CJSG's Burden of Proof Rules in art 6 of the CISG)? 
Finally, it is useful to consider why the question of whether the 
CISG regulates the burden of proof, and thereby pre-empts domestic 
law (including 'procedural' law, however defined), may potentially 
not matter in cases where the parties have agreed to arbitration. The 
reason is housed in art 6, which gives the parties the right to 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of the CISG's provisions 
(with the exception of art 12), including the general principles 
underlying the CISG, in accordance with art 7(2). Such derogation 
may, according to the prevailing and convincing view, also occur 
implicitly.42 
Against this background, an arbitration agreement between the 
parties selecting arbitration rules which contain provisions on the 
burden of proof (for example, as in the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
41 
42 
CISG, above n 17, art 7(1). 
Cour de Cassation [French Court ofCassation], 99-12.87, 25 October 
2005, CISG-online No 1226; Oberster Gerichtshof [Austrian 
Supreme Court], CISG-online No 828, 17 December 2003; Ingeborg 
Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, 'Article 6' in Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods (CJSG) , (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2016) 102. 
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Rules)43 or on the taking of evidence by the arbitral tribunal (for 
example, as in the Vienna Arbitration Rules)44 could potentially be 
read as a derogation from the CISG ' s burden of proof rules. 
Whether such a derogation was intended by the parties has to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis applying the interpretative 
standards of art 8 of the CISG. It remains a particularly interesting 
and challenging question which proof-related rules prevail in cases 
in which the parties have chosen both the CISG and the above types 
of arbitration rules. 
III A MA TIER OF GOOD INTENTIONS: PLACING THE ISSUE OF THE 
ALLOCATION OF BURDEN OF PROOF WITHIN THE CISG 
(LARRY DIMATTEO) 
Professor Schroeter eloquently summarises the rationales given in 
support of the mainstream view that the allocation of the burden of 
proof is within the scope of the CISG. The main arguments are 
based on analogical reasoning among the provisions of the CISG 
and, alternatively, through the recognition of the burden of proof as 
an implied general principle. The existence of burden-allocating 
words, such as 'prove', 'unless', and 'except' allow for the inference 
that the allocation of the burden of proof is expressly dealt with by 
the CISG. The mainstream argument advances that these provision-
specific cases should be read as reflecting an implied general 
43 
44 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, GA RES 65/22, UN GAOR, 65th sess, 
Agenda Item 77, UN Doc A/65/465 (JO January 2011) art 27(1): 
'Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to 
support his claim or defence '. 
Vienna International Arbitration Centre, Vienna Rules of Arbitration 
(1 July 2013) art 29(1): ' If the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary, 
it may on its own initiative collect evidence, question parties or 
witnesses, request the parties to submit evidence, and call experts '. 
...,_ 
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principle based on the international character of the CISG, the 
commonality of burden allocations across legal systems and the 
importance of harmonisation of laws. 
This section will focus on three areas: firstly, it will demonstrate 
why the burden of proof is not within the scope of the CISG; 
secondly, it will examine why that question is not of great 
importance; and finally, it will determine, if the burden of proof is 
within the scope of the CISG, whether the standard of proof is also 
within its scope. As to the first point, it will be argued that nothing 
in the drafting history of the CISG indicates that the burden of proof 
was intended to be within its scope. The burden of proof is 
essentially a matter of procedure to be determined by the court of 
the /ex fori and the nuances of burden of proof presumptions and 
burden shifting vary across legal systems. 
The internal-external gap distinction is a good place to start any 
discussion of whether a particular issue or topic is within the 
coverage of the CISG. An internal gap or praeter legem, is a topic 
that is not expressly dealt with in the CISG by way of an express 
principle or rule, but the issue is one commonly found in an area that 
the CISG covers. The internal gap argument is that the 'rule gap' is 
attached to an express rule or principle of the CISG and therefore, 
the gap is to be filled using CISG interpretive methodology; the 
court or arbitral panel shall develop an autonomous interpretation. 
Autonomous interpretation in relation to filling in an internal gap 
means the creation of an autonomous rule or principle free of 
national law bias. Its autonomy is derived mainly through analogical 
reasoning from the most pertinent CISG provisions and general 
principles . 
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An external gap or intra legem is an area of sales or contract law 
that is expressly or implicitly outside the scope of the CISG.45 There 
is a much larger group of issues that are implicitly excluded from 
the CISG, the reason being that the CISG is largely a non-
comprehensive set of legal rules.46 Article 4 states the extent of the 
scope of the CISG as governing ' only the formation of the contract 
of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer 
arising from such a contract' .47 Also, art 4' s description of coverage 
indicates that the CISG is a body of substantive, and not procedural 
rules. 
If this is the case, one argument against the inclusion of the issue of 
the burden of proof within the CISG is that it does not come within 
the substantive sweep of art 4. However, the CISG is a bit more 
nuanced than is indicated by this substantive law argument. For 
example, art 11 provides a rule of evidence allowing for the 
admission of extrinsic evidence, including witness testimony. As 
noted by Professor Schroeter, art 79 expressly allocates the burden 
of proving the existence of an impediment to the claiming party ' if 
he proves that the failure was due to an impediment' .48 
In determining whether the burden of proof is an internal or external 
gap, the following rationales will be explored: the legislative 
history, the purpose and general principles of the CISG, and the 
substantive-procedural law distinction. The drafting history of the 
45 
46 
47 
48 
There are a handful of issues and topics expressly excluded from the 
reach of the CISG. See CISG, above n 17, arts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 28. 
Examples include pre-contractual liability or the duty of good faith 
negotiations, limitation period, duty of confidentiality, mistake, 
misrepresentation, undue influence, and duress. 
CISG, above n 17, art 4 ( emphasis added). 
Ibid art 79 (emphasis added). 
.... 
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CISG is at best ambiguous when it comes to the allocation of the 
burden of proof. Again, the main example given by proponents of 
the position that the burden of proof is an internal gap is that some 
CISG provisions contain indications of the burden of proof, such as 
art 79(1).49 The fact that a few provisons in the CISG reference the 
burden of proof is a thin reed to imply that more general rules 
relating to the burden of proof are within its scope. A broader, yet 
stronger, argument posed by Professor Schroeter is that the primary 
purpose of the CISG is the harmonisation of law, and therefore, it 
should be broadly construed. Thus, when in doubt, the courts and 
arbitral tribunals should avoid the nuance of national sales laws in 
favour of an extension of the CISG. Against this argument is the 
legislative history supporting the view that the CISG does not 
regulate the burden of proof. 50 
Despite the 'broadly' construed argument noted above, the scope of 
the CISG must be determined through CISG interpretive 
methodology and other traditional methods of interpretation. 51 First, 
one should use general principles. However, the problem of general 
principles - such as good faith and international character - is that 
they are empty vessels that can be filled in different ways depending 
upon the motivation of the interpreter. Almost any issue can be 
bootstrapped to such language to include the issue within the scope 
of the CISG. However, arguments for recognising some of these 
issues not expressly dealt with by CISG language and treating them 
49 
50 
51 
CISG, above n I 7, Official Records II 238 s. 
lbid II ss 295. 
Andre Janssen and Larry DiMatteo, 'Interpretive Uncertainty: 
Methodological Solutions for Interpreting the CISG' (20 I 2) 2 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Handelsrecht (Netherlands Journal of 
Commercial law) 52 . 
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as internal gaps are plausible, whereas others are so extenuated that 
they are wholly implausible. 
An example of a plausible connection of an issue to CISG coverage 
is the issue of the rate of interest. Article 78 states that: 
If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in 
arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, without 
prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under 
article 74.52 
This provision demonstrates a common problem with CISG 
provisions: the lack of detail and guidance as to the scope of the 
provision's intended coverage, leaving many questions unanswered. 
What does ' sums that is in arrears' actually mean? Does it cover all 
sums in arrears? Does it cover just the buyer's non-payment or 
belated payment of the price? Does it include the period of time in 
which a seller holds payment that is subsequently refunded? Does it 
include the payment of interest on the period from which damages 
are awarded in court or arbitration and the time that the judgment or 
award is actually satisfied? Finally, should determining the rate of 
interest be considered an internal gap to be filled through the use of 
art 7 or is it an external gap to be filled under national laws? 
The legislative history pertaining to art 79 notes that the 'ICC 
proposes that paragraph (5) be amended to assure that an exemption 
would not preclude the injured party from claiming interest or 
compensation due to any change in currency rates' .53 Further, the 
52 
53 
CISG, above n 17, art 78. 
Comments and Proposals by Governments and International 
Organisations on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the Sale of 
International Sale of Goods, and on Draft Provisions Concerning 
Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses, UN Doc 
NCONF.97/9 (21 February I 980). 
.... 
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legislative history shows that there were a number of issues not dealt 
with directly by the language of art 78: 
Interest on delay in receiving price or any other sum 
in arrears: 
78AI Must the sum be 'liquidated'? Delay in paying 
damages. 
78B Rate of interest. 
78B2 Aggrieved party's loss from borrowing; current 
interest rates. 
78B3 Applicable domestic law; compounding of 
interest.54 
The original text of art 78 provided a fuller coverage relating to the 
issue of claiming interest as damages. It states that 'the seller is in 
any event entitled to interest on such sum as is in arrears at a rate 
equal to the official discount rate in the country where he bas his 
place of business' .55 Subsequent legislative history uses the term 
'the party in default'. 56 Professor Scblecbtriem notes that 'the 
interest question provoked extraordinary difficulties at the 
Conference'. 57 He notes that the payment of interest was discussed 
in the negotiations leading to the 1978 Draft Convention in a very 
narrow context, resulting in a single provision concerning the 
payment of interest related to the seller's duty to refund the price 
54 
55 
56 
57 
UNCITRAL Outline of the CISG (The UNCITRAL Thesaurus), UN 
Doc A/CN.9/SER.C/GUIDE/l (12 September 1995). 
' Report of Committee of the Whole I Relating to the Draft 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods ' UN Doc A/32/17 (23 
May-17 June 1977) annex I. 
Report of the First Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.97/11 (7 April 
1980). 
Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Manz, 1986) 98 . 
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after avoidance of the sales contract'.58 In a subsequent version, the 
scope of the interest provisions broadened with a general statement 
that 'the obligation to pay interest as a general rule [is] so that a 
debtor still remains liable for interest payments even if his default is 
due to an impediment beyond his control'. 59 It is also interesting to 
note that the payment of interest relates to different CISG 
provisions. For example, the legislative history discusses that 'if the 
seller is bound to refund the price, he must also pay interest thereon 
from the date on which the price was paid',60 which was 
subsequently embedded in art 84. 
Courts and scholars are divided on whether the rate to be charged is 
within or outside the scope of the CJSG. This is similar to the split 
on the issue of the burden of proof, although the majority opinion is 
that the burden of proof is within the scope of the CISG. In the case 
of the rate of interest, unlike the burden of proof, there is an express 
provision dealing with the issue of the payment of interest. 
A Vienna arbitration panel reasoned, in a manner much like those 
who assert that the burden of proof is with the scope of the CISG, 
that the issue of the rate of interest was an internal gap 'because the 
immediate recourse to a particular domestic law may lead to results 
which are incompatible with the principle embodied in art 78' .61 
However, the arbitration panel conditioned the above statement by 
noting that this should be the case 'at least in the cases where the 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Ibid. 
Ibid 99. 
Report of the First Committee, UN Doc NCONF.97/11 (7 April 
1980). 
Rolled Metal Sheets Case (Award, Case No SCH-4366, Vienna 
Arbitration Proceeding, 15 June 1994). 
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law in question expressly prohibits the payment of interest'. 62 
onetheless, numerous scholars and courts have held the issue of 
the rate of interest to be outside the scope of art 78. A German court 
held that the rate of interest was outside of the scope of the CISG by 
noting, ' that a uniform solution could not be achieved at the 
conferences for the drafting of the CISG, as the different opinions 
about the interest obligation were irreconcilable'. 63 Some scholars 
and courts have argued that it is within the coverage of art 78. 64 
Another case study involving the scope of the CISG will be 
undertaken before proceeding to the issue of the burden of proof. An 
example of an implausible extension of the scope of the CISG 
would be to argue that the issue of hardship is within the scope of 
'impediment' found in art 79. There is a debate between those who 
view hardship as a form of impediment covered under art 79 and 
those that view that art 79 should be strictly construed as covering 
only impossibility or force majeure. The neutrality provided by the 
word 'impediment' is no doubt an attempt to avoid the rift between 
countries that recognise hardship and those that do not. For example, 
the common law and German civil law are divided on whether 
hardship or changed circumstances can provide an excuse or 
62 
63 
64 
Ibid. 
Landgericht Aachen (District Court Aachen), Case No 41 0 111/95, 
20 July 1995). 
Lugano, Cantone de/ Ticino, Tribunale d'appel/o (Appellate Court 
Lugano, Canton ofTicino, Case No 12.97.00193, 15 January 1998; 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Case 
o 9448, July 1999; See also EA Farnsworth, 'CISG Article 78: 
Endless disagreement among commentators, much less among the 
courts' in CM Bianca and Michael J Bonell (eds), 'Commentary on 
the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention ' 
(Fred 8 Rothman & Co 1987) 570. 
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exemption from liability for breach of contract. Hardship is not 
grounds for excuse under the common law. 65 In contrast, the 
German law's concept of change of circumstances provides relief 
for cases of objective and subjective impossibility, frustration of 
purpose and hardship.66 
Professor Honnold has noted that the word impediment was 
substituted for the word 'circumstances' to disallow the granting of 
an exemption 'merely because performance became more difficult 
or unprofitable'. 67 Peter Schlechtriem also examined whether mere 
unaffordability could support a claim of impediment and concluded 
that 'increased procurement and production costs do not constitute 
exempting impediments'.68 However, he argues that the lack of 
coverage of hardship in art 79 is an internal gap under the 
harmonisation rationale, reasoning that it would prevent the entry of 
divergent national law views on the subject.69 
However, the case law has narrowly construed art 79 and courts 
have not provided exemptions due to hardship. For example, in a 
Dutch case, a seller claimed an exemption because a frost had 
prevented the delivery of the contract amount of mandarin 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
However, the notion of hardship is captured within the American 
Uniform Commercial Code under the doctrine of impracticability, see 
UCC § 2-615 (2002). Ln practice, the courts rarely use the excuse of 
impracticability to relieve a party from its contractual obligations. 
See BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany) §§ 275, 313 ; 
See also L DiMatteo, 'Contractual Excuse Under the CISG: 
Impediment, Hardship, and the Excuse Doctrines' (2015) 27 Pace 
International Law Review 258, 261 . 
DiMatteo, above n 66,279. 
Ibid 280. 
Sch lechtriem, above n 57, 100. 
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oranges. 70 Instead of using general principles, the Court looked to 
French and Swiss law to find a possible hardship. The Court then 
applied the good faith principle, arguing that the buyer should have 
accepted a lesser quality substitute, and avoided the key issue of 
whether the changed circumstances amounted to an impediment 
under art 79. 
The Belgian Supreme Court in the Scaform International case 
rejected the lower court' s decision that the issue of hardship was an 
external gap. 7 1 The Court structured an argument that the general 
principles of art 7, especially the duty of good faith, supported the 
inclusion of hardship within the scope of art 79. However, this 
decision can be criticised as placing a civil law perspective on the 
issue of the scope of impediment, instead of making an autonomous 
interpretation as required under art 7. First, the Court did not make a 
convincing argument that the notion of impediment goes beyond 
impossibility to mere hardship. Second, the notion of hardship as 
espoused by the court was aligned with the German civil law 
concept of 'changed circumstances ' and not discussed within a 
neutral, international perspective. 
Third, the Court referenced the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts ('PICC' )72 to support the argument that 
70 
71 
72 
CA Colmar Cour d'appel (French Appellate Court) Case No 1 A 
I 99800359, 12 June 2001 ; See Tribunale Civile di Monza (District 
Court Monza), RG 4267/88, 14 January 1993. 
Hof van Cassatie [Court of Cessation - Supreme Court], 
C.07.0289.N, 19 June 2009 June 19, 2009 ('Scaform International 
case'). 
' [T]o fill the gaps in a uniform manner adhesion, should be sought 
with the general principles which govern the law of international 
trade. Under these principles, as incorporated inter alia in the 
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hardship can be viewed as an impediment under art 79. In fact, the 
Court went further by suggesting that the PICC can be directly used 
to interpret art 79. This is problematic because the PICC contains 
both an excuse or impossibility provision and a hardship provision, 
while the CISG possesses the single provision of impediment. 73 The 
Scaform International case fails to live up to the mandate of 
autonomous interpretation of CISG provisions by borrowing 
concepts of civil law countries - hardship, contractual 
disequilibrium, and the right-duty of renegotiation. Despite the 
findings in Scafom International, art 79 cases have focused on the 
more traditional excuse of impossibility. 
If the restrictive or narrow view of art 79, as espoused in the 
Secretariat Commentary and sustained by existing case law, remains 
true, then it becomes the oddest article in the CISG. A major 
rationale in support of a more expansive view of art 79 is the duty of 
good faith in art 7. However, that general principle is another 
example of civil law jurists and scholars bootstrapping a duty of 
good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts, political 
reasons aside, to the clear mandate of art 7 that good faith is 
restricted to the interpretation of CISG provisions. By neglecting the 
literal meaning of art 7, a general duty of good faith in sales 
contracts was smuggled into the CISG under rationales, including its 
usage in trade or its ancillary application to the reasonableness 
standard found throughout the CISG. 
73 
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the party 
who invokes changed circumstances that fundamentally disturb the 
contractual balance is also entitled to claim the renegotiation of the 
contract'. 
DiMatteo, above n 66, 284. 
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In the end, whether it is a legitimate interpretation or not, a general 
duty of good faith has been ensconced in CISG jurisprudence. 
Eventually, as the CISG expands its reach, the underlying principle 
of good faith should encourage a wider use of art 79, especially 
when parties overreach and risks are unintentionally misallocated 
and where real substantive injustices dictate acts of judicial and 
arbitral discretion. Article 79 has a long way to go to be interpreted 
as providing exemptions in cases of hardship. In practice, the 
malleability of phrases, such as 'impediment', 'foreseeability' and 
'beyond a party's control' have been used to render art 79 a most 
restrictive excuse doctrine. 
A more liberal interpretation of art 79 may include recognising 
exemptions for severe hardship, as supported by the CISG Advisory 
Council. 74 In the words of Professor Ulrich Magnus, 'although not 
often granted, the CISG's exemption provision is always 
theoretically applicable'.75 However, the approach that a provision 
of the CISG is 'always theoretically applicable' is a slippery slope 
that pro-CISG scholars, courts and the CISG Advisory Council have 
fallen prey to. The idealistic quest for the harmonisation of 
international sales law must not overreach to arbitrarily expand what 
is clearly a non-comprehensive sales law instrument. The non-
comprehensiveness of the CISG must be recognised and respected. 
74 
75 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under 
Article 79 of the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, 
Columbia University School of Law, New York, NY, USA. Adopted 
by the CISG-AC at its I Ith meeting in Wuhan, People's Republic of 
China, on 12 October 2007. 
Ulrich Magnus, 'Remedies: Damages, Price Reduction, Avoidance, 
Mitigation, and Preservation' in L DiMatteo (ed), International Sales 
Law: A Global Challenge (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 257, 
261. 
232 International Trade and Business Law Review 
In comparing the gaps of arts 78 and 79, there is greater plausibility 
in arguing that the rate of interest is an internal gap. This is given 
that there is an explicit provision on interest within the CISG. Tying 
hardship to the concept of impediment is much less plausible given 
the different meanings applied to the concepts of impossibility or 
force majeure and hardshjp. It is less implausible for the German 
courts to argue subjective impossibility is within the notion of 
impediment. However, an autonomous interpretation should lead 
them to the recognition that subjective impossibility is unjque to 
German law, while objective impossibility, event or obstacle 
external to the parties is the core concept of national excuse 
doctrines and most force majeure clauses. The issue of the 
allocation of the burden of proof as being within the CISG also fails 
the plausibility test. There is no express provision like ' interest' in 
art 78 or 'impedement' in art 79 to rationalise it as other than an 
external gap. 
Again, the harmorusation and substantive or substantive-like 
rationales for the inclusion of the burden of proof are extenuated at 
best. Article 4 of the CISG states that the 'CISG governs only the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer' . Thus, the strongest case for the inclusion of 
the burden of proof within the scope of the CISG is that it is a rule 
of substantive law, which is clearly not the case. An alternative 
argument is that it is of such importance that it is substantive-like. If 
it is so important as to be closely linked to substantive law, why was 
an express prov1s10n dealing with the burden of proof not 
incorporated into the CISG? The arbitral panel in Maaden v 
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Thyssen76 asserted that if it was part of substantive law it is an 
external gap to be determined by 'rules of private international 
law' 77 and if it is part of procedural law, then it would be determined 
by the lexfori.78 
A further danger of including the burden of proof within the scope 
of the CISG is that the next logical step would be to argue that it 
should be extended to include the standard of proof. Unlike the 
allocation of the burden of proof, whose allocation is relatively 
consistent across legal systems, the standard of proof varies greatly 
across legal systems. For example, the standard of proof is similar in 
nature between the US (' preponderance of the evidence ') and the 
United Kingdom ('balance of probabilities' ), but vastly different in 
Germany (' conviction close to certainty so that reasonable doubts 
are silenced' ) and Italy ('facts unproven even if possible or likely' ). 
Thus, the possibility of a court bringing the issue of standard of 
proof within the scope of the CISG would be problematic. 
Alternatively stated, if harmonisation is the objective, then an 
autonomous interpretation of the standard of proof would be much 
more important than the allocation of the burden of proof. However, 
just like the burden of proof, that type of harmonisation is not as 
sustainable as the simple filling ofan internal gap in the CISG. 
Furthermore, how does the implied allocation of the burden of proof 
relate to a choice of law or forum selection clause? The insertion of 
choice of law or forum selection clauses implies that the parties 
agree to the procedural rules of the chosen law or court. Would the 
76 
77 
78 
Maaden v Thyssen, Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce, Case No 6653 of 1993, 26 March 1993. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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choice of law or forum be considered a derogation of the so-called 
CISG implied allocation of burden of proof rule? Possibly not, 
because such clauses do not expressly derogate from this implied 
burden of proof allocation. This is another example of the problem 
created by bringing the allocation of the burden of proof within the 
scope of the CISG. One final point is that allocation of the burden of 
proof is a much more nuanced issue than a simple allocation would 
imply, since there is variation of national rules on presumptions and 
exceptions related to the shifting of the burden of proof. This may 
again be rationalised by the notion of harmonisation, but in fact the 
complexity of burden of proof ossies would leaves a sordid mess for 
courts to autonomously interpret when presumptions are to be given 
or burdens shifted. This is simply too far afield and best left to 
domestic law where it belongs. In sum, there is a less than a 
persuasive argument that the allocation of the burden of proof is a 
topic implicitly within the scope of the CTSG. 
IV A TIORNEY F EES: INCLUDED (ANDRE JANSSEN) 
The question of whether the recovery of attorney' s fees is covered 
by the CISG is important because domestic civil procedural laws on 
the topic vary worldwide. In the first place, it matters in the US and 
the few countries that follow the so-called American Rule. As a 
default rule, it requires each party to a legal dispute to bear their 
own legal costs. The winning party pays its own legal costs and 
cannot collect those costs as damages. Jn such legal systems, the 
question of whether attorney's fees can be considered as damages 
under the CISG is an important one as it would pre-empt the 
application of the American Rule. The majority of common and 
civil law countries, including Germany (civil) and Australia 
(common), have procedural rules that abide by the 'costs-follow-
the-event' principle, also known as the loser pays rule, which allows 
the winning party to recover at least a portion of its legal costs as 
damages. 
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Thus, whether the CISG is applicable to the issue of the 
recoverability of legal costs would make a substantial difference in 
damages. If legal fees are within the scope of the CISG, whether or 
not they are recoverable would pre-empt the application of the loser 
pays rule, just as it would the American Rule. First, if it is 
determined that legal fees are within the scope of the CISG and are 
not recoverable as damages, then the normal damages awarded 
under the loser pays rule would be diminished. Second, if the case is 
within the scope of the CISG and costs are recoverable, then the 
exact amount recoverable would be determined by an autonomous 
interpretation unbiased from the nuances of the loser pays rule 
across national legal systems. 
The uncertainty of the recoverability of legal costs as damages under 
art 74 of the CISG is partially due to a division among judges and 
scholars as to whether they are recoverable, as well as the diverging 
legal arguments used to support the different views. Arguably, the 
majority of scholars79 hold the view espoused in Opinion No 6 of 
the CISG Advisory Council, that attorney's fees are not recoverable 
under the CISG and are purely a procedural question governed by 
national civil procedure laws. 80 However, several scholars have 
asserted that attorney's fees are recoverable as part of the damages 
allowed under art 74 of the CISG. 81 
79 
80 
81 
See I Schwenzer, 'Rechtsverfolgungskosten als Schaden?' in 
P Gauch, F Werro and P Pichonnaz (eds), Melanges en l'honneur de 
Pierre Tercier (Schulthess, 2008) 417. 
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No 6: Calculation of Damages 
Under CISG Article 74 (Rapporteur: Professor John Y Gotanda) . 
See B Piltz, 'Litigation Costs as Reimbursable Damages,' in 
L DiMatteo ( ed), International Sales Law: A Global Challenge 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) 286. 
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The courts have failed to find a common or uniform approach on the 
matter and are unlikely to do so in the immediate future. For 
example, some civil law countries that follow the loser pays rule, 
such as Belgium,82 Germany,83 the Netherlands84 and Switzerland85 
have interpreted art 74 to include the collection of attorney's fees as 
reimbursable damages. ln the opposite direction, US courts, with the 
exception of the District Court decision in the Zapata case86 
(subsequently reversed on appeal), have held that whether or not 
attorney's fees are recoverable is a purely national issue and outside 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
Rechtbank van Koophandel te Hasselt (Commercial Court Hasselt), 
CISG-online No 1107, 12 January 2006. 
Landgericht Milnchen (District Court MUnchen), CISG-online No 
1998, 18 May 2009; Landgericht Potsdam (District Court Potsdam) 
CISG-online No 1979, 7 April 2009; Landgericht Hamburg (District 
Court Hamburg), CISG-online No 1999, 17 February 2009; 
Ober!cUJdesgericht K1>ln (Provincial Appellate Court Cologne), CISG-
online No 1218, 3 April 2006; Oberlandesgericht Dilsseldorf 
(Provincial Appellate Court Dilsseldorf), CISG-online No 916, 
22 Jul:Y ~004; Oberlandesgericht Dilsseldorf (Provincial Appellate 
Court Dilsseldorf), CISG-online No 201 , 11 July 1996. 
RechtPank Rotterdam (District Court Rotterdam}, CISG-online No 
2098, 1 7 March 20 I O; Rechtbank Rotterdam (District Court 
Rotte1darn), CISG-online No 1815, 21 January 2009; Hofs-
Herto$enbosch (Hof District Appeal Court), CISG-online No 550, 
2 Octi:>ber 1997. 
Kanwns~ericht Zug (District Court Zug), CISG-online No 2024, 27 
Nove/Tlb~r 2008; Handelsgericht des Kantons Aargau (Commercial 
Court Aa.rgau), CISG-online No 418, 19 December 1997. 
Zapafa lfermanos Sucesores, SA v Hearthside Baking Co Inc dlbla 
Maurice Lene/! Cooley Co, 155 F Supp 2d 969 (ND Ill , 2001); Later 
oveTJille<j by Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, SA v Hearthside Baking 
Co JriC d!b/a Maurice Lenell Cooky Co, 313 F 3d 385 (ih Cir, 2002). 
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the scope of the CISG.87 However, the US District Court of New 
York in the Stemcor case expressed doubts, stating that 
' Article 74 ... does not unambiguously bar recovery of legal fees 
and costs'. 88 It is yet to be seen whether the Stemcor decision has 
any impact on future cases involving the application of the CISG by 
US courts. 
A First Argument for the Recoverability of Attorney's Fees Under 
the CJSG: Plain Meaning of the CJSG 
To find the correct answer to the question of whether attorney's fees 
are recoverable under the CISG as damages requires an 
interpretation of the wording of the CISG. Article 4(1) states that 
' (t)his Convention governs (only) the formation of the contract of 
sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising 
from such a contract'. 89 There is no specific exclusion of the legal 
costs issue in art 4(2) or elsewhere in the CISG. Article 74 states 
that 'damages for breach of contract by one party consists of a sum 
equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party 
as a consequence of the breach' .90 
Reading art 4 in conjunction with art 74, using the plain meaning of 
the language, the most plausible argument is that attorney's fees 
should be recoverable under the full compensation principle ('sum 
equal to the loss') of art 74. In addition, there is nothing further in 
87 
88 
89 
90 
See only Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, SA v Hearthside Baking Co 
Inc d/bla Maurice Lene/I Cooky Co, 313 F 3d 385 (7th Cir, 2002); 
Ajax Tool Works Inc v Can-Eng Manufacturing Ltd (ND Ill, 2003). 
Stemcor USA Inc v Miracero, SA de CV, 66 F Supp 3d 394 (SD NY, 
2014) 
CISG, above n 17, art4(1). 
Ibid art 74. 
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the CISG or official ClSG documents that limits the phrase 'sum 
equal to the loss ' . Anecdotally, to emphasise the plain meaning 
approach, the attorney' s fees problem was posed to 50 law students 
in an International Sales Law class. The students were asked to read 
the texts of art 4 and 74 and give their opinions on whether the 
recoverability of attorney' s fees is within the scope of the CISG. All 
50 students answered that the wording of the CISG unambiguously 
supported the recoverability of legal costs as damages. 
B Second Argument f or the Recoverability of Attorney's Fees Under 
the CISG: The Principle of Full Compensation 
One of the fundamental principles on which the CISG is based is the 
principle of full compensation for all losses.9 1 There are only two 
requirements which need to be fulfilled in order to recover damages 
related to a breach of contract:92 (1) proof of damages; and (2) that 
those damages were a foreseeable consequence of the breach at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract.93 The incurrence of legal 
costs due to a breach of contract is foreseeable and a direct 
consequence of the breach under art 74. Placing the recoverability of 
attorney 's fees outside the scope of the CISG would interfere with 
the underlying principle of full compensation. Only an express 
exclusion of legal costs as recoverable damages can pre-empt the 
application of fundamental principles, such as full compensation for 
any loss.94 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Ibid arts 45, 61 , 74. 
Ibid arts 45, 61. 
Ibid art 74. 
See Piltz, above n 81 , 293. 
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CSummary 
This contribution has demonstrated that there are good arguments -
the plain meaning interpretation of the CISG and the principle of 
full compensation - for the recoverability of attorney's fees as 
damages under art 74 CISG. However, considering the diverging 
case law and views in the legal literature, it is obvious that this 
important practical issue is far from being resolved. The failure of 
the courts to apply CISG interpretive methodology properly, by 
applying general principles of uniformly to interpret the CISG on 
this subject is unsettling. Best practice suggests that the issue of the 
recoverability of attorney's fees should be expressly dealt with in 
the contract. 95 
VA TIORNEY FEES: NOT INCLUDED (CAMILLA BAASCH ANDERSEN) 
It is fascinating, to a (slowly) ageing academic, how fashion has an 
ebb and flow: beehive hair, short skirts, platform shoes, even 
shoulder pads. Eventually, everything comes back into fashion . So it 
is with legal issues under the CISG as well it seems, as we now find 
ourselves revisiting an old classic: should attorney's fees be 
recoverable as damages under art 74? The topic is in fashion again. 96 
95 
96 
Although, it should be noted that 'attorney fee clauses' are routinely 
disregarded under the American rule. In the US, they are considered 
as pre-empted by the rules of civil procedure or as illegal penalties. 
This issue was covered extensively in academic literature around the 
time of the Zapata case. See, amongst others (some more recently): 
John Felemegas, 'The Award of Counsel's Fees under Article 74 
CISG, in Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v Hearthside Baking Co 
(2002) 6 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration 30-39; Bruno Zeller ' Interpretation of Article 74 -
Zapata Hermanos v Hearthside Baking - Where Next?' (2004) 1 
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Ah, how I remember with fondness the days of the Zapata v 
Hermanos case,97 how we toiled over that Amicus Curiae98 - oh, 
how we lamented for the bakery and how we sulked when the 
Certiorari was denied.99 Ah yes, what a missed opportunhy for the 
US Supreme Court. However, I will get back to that ... Now let's 
get to the point; why should art 74 not include attorney's fees? 
97 
98 
99 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law I, 1-11 ; Norman J Shachoy 
symposium, 'Attorneys ' Fees: Last Ditch Stand?' in 'Assessing the 
CISG and Other International Endeavors to Unify International 
Contract Law: Has the Time Come for a New Global Initiative to 
Harmonize and Unify International Trade?' (2013) 58 Villanova Law 
Review 4, 761-71; Milena Dordevic, ' Mexican Revolution' in 
Vasiljevic et al (eds), C/SG Jurisprudence and Case-Law: Attorneys' 
Fees as (Non) Recoverable Loss for Breach of Contract, in Private 
Law and Law Reform in South East Europe: Liber Amorcorum 
Christa Jessel-Holst (Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, 20 I 0) 
199; Harry Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys Fees as Damages under 
the UN Sales Convention: A Case Study on New International 
Practice and the Role of Foreign Case Law in CISG Jurisprudence, 
with comments on Zapata Hermanos Succesores SA v Hearthside 
Baking Co (2002) 22 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 121; Joseph Lookofsky, 'Comments on Zapata Herrnanos v 
Hearthside Baking' (2002) 6 Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Arbitration 27; Joseph Lookofsky, Viva Zapata! C!SG 
Article 74 and the American Rule (8 January 2003) Pace Law School 
Institute of International Commercial Law <http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky7.html>. 
Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, SA v Hearthside Baking Co Inc d/b/a 
Maurice Lenell Cooky Co, 313 F 3d 385 (7th Cir, 2002). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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A Right but Wrong 
My learned colleague Professor Jansen has promoted the argument 
in favour of applying art 74 to attorney's fees and - although I am 
representing the opposing view - allow me to confess that from a 
personal and subjective perspective, as a legal theorist and a civil 
lawyer: I agree! Surprise ... art 74 is a no-fault full compensation 
rule, and as such it seems logical to include attorney's fees. 
However - and here I reverse my opinion 180 degrees - my 
subjective opinion on the application of a no-fault full compensation 
rule is irrelevant. What is relevant is that this rule is a shared 
international rule, and my subjective perspective is that of a civil 
lawyer, to whom the procedural and substantive distinction is 
largely immaterial in the context of full compensation. 100 Article 7 
requires this shared rule to apply with 'international character' and 
'uniformity'. 101 Experience tells us, quite clearly, that this 
uniformity is not achieved if we try to force States to submit to 
practices which are contrary to their own legal systems. 102 
Therefore, let us look at this issue from a transnational comparative 
law perspective. 
100 
IOI 
102 
As of 3rd March 2016 UNCITRAL reports that 84 States have 
adopted the CISG, see UNCITRAL, Status Unites Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods 
(Vienna, 1980) (2016). 
CISG, above n 17, art 7(1) prescribes that: ' In the interpretation of 
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and 
to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade'. 
See generally Camilla Andersen, Uniform Application of the 
International Sales Law (Kluwer Law International, 2007). 
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B Homeward Trends in Cases and in Scholarships 
All the reported cases where art 74 has been stretched to include 
lawyers ' fees are - to my knowledge - from civil law 
jurisdictions which embrace the loser pays doctrine, and do not 
distinguish the lawyers ' fees too much from the substantive 
compensation elements. However, to the common lawyer, especially 
the (on this occasion, misunderstood) Americans who do not 
embrace ' loser pays ', this issue is so blatantly one of procedure and 
not subject to the substantive regulation of the CISG. I recall my 
former mentor Lookofsky debating the issue with passion, referring 
to the judge which was swayed by the civil law approach as 'soft in 
the head' (I am hoping memory serves me here, and that I am not 
sued) and revering Possner's reversal of the Zapata findings. 
Academics do not get much more passionate than that ... so where 
does that leave us? 
On the one hand, broadly speaking, we have civil lawyers, scholars 
and judges who are happy to stretch art 74 to lawyers' fees in 
pursuit of a uniform approach - because it does not shake their 
world too much, and seems like a sound pursuit of a lofty goal. They 
use art 74 analogously to the procedural issue of lawyers ' fees 
because they do not distinguish as religiously between the two and 
because using art 74 is convenient due to their procedural ' loser 
pays ' rule under which they would have awarded those damages 
anyway. On the other hand, we have a set of very disturbed common 
law lawyers, scholars and judges to whom this is simply wrong. 
Some of the more internationalised ones are willing to entertain the 
notion that this should be compromised on the altar of uniformity. 
However, the reality is that - especially on the benches - these 
are a very small minority. 
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C Safeguarding Uniformity 
So we cannot include lawyers' fees under art 74. To stretch this 
uniform substantive regulation into the area of procedure is fine if 
all players agree to do it to pursue uniformity across borders. 
However, to do it only in some parts, while others refuse due to a 
different legal classification and legal culture in the area, is folly. 
Let the civil lawyers continue to award damages under art 74 if they 
must - but let it be clear that they are using it analogously to 
embrace full compensation in a procedural field. Let it be clear that 
we are not - and cannot - force our common law cousins to do it. 
So to produce certainty and predictability we must advise our clients 
that this issue is outside the scope of the CISG. To advise otherwise, 
and to prescribe otherwise in a scholarly context, is to sow 
uncertainty and unpredictability unnecessarily. 
So, back to the certiorari and the Amicus - did we toil in vain? No, 
we did not. I still lament the fact that the US Supreme Court did not 
feel inclined to rule on this issue. What we needed at the time was a 
strong judicial voice considering the uniformity issues raised in the 
certiorari alongside the civil law cases citing, deciding, in principle, 
that this is procedural and that the US does not wish to extend art 74 
as far as others have done. Possner' s reversal in the Court of Appeal 
in Zapata centred on foreseeability and not the inclusion issue. The 
certiorari was never about wanting US courts to side with the 
German and Italian case law, but to at least consider the issue of 
uniform application and make a deliberate decision in the light of 
that. I can almost see Al Kritzer smiling down on me from his cloud 
as I write this. It was a shame that the US Supreme Court missed 
this opportunity to raise awareness of the application of the 
international character of the CISG while making a clear decision on 
the issue of inclusion - many other US issues could have been 
averted. 
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However then - a silver lining - perhaps if the certiorari bad not 
been denied, we would have had a different question for the Vis 
problem this year? I rest my case and look forward to ensuing 
discussions and dissenting opinions. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The above discussion proves two widely accepted findings when 
dealing both with international transactions and the harmonisation of 
the law applicable to them. First, it is crucial to define the terms 
used precisely and to explain what is meant by them. The same tenn 
may often be used with a different scope in different jurisdictions. 
Without a precise terminology which clearly distinguishes, for 
example, between the various aspects of the burden of proof, the 
standard of proof and the means to meet such standard, there is a 
high risk that apples will be compared to pears. Second, the 
tendency to fall back on domestic concepts to interpret broad terms 
under the CISG will probably continue until case law across various 
jurisdictions has developed a commonly acknowledged meaning for 
such terms. That applies a fortiori when it comes to filling gaps in 
the CISG either by the general principles underlying the CISG or by 
reference to national law. Thus, it can only be hoped that the highest 
courts in every jurisdiction take every chance to contribute to the 
development of such a commonly accepted interpretation. 
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